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Summary
This article examines the relationship between institutional fragmentation and the spatial
extent of cities in Europe’s Functional Urban Areas. European Union planning regulations vary
across member states, but in most cases, local authorities determine land use within the
more general regulatory frameworks set by national or subnational authorities. More
decentralised and fragmented settings may favour urban sprawl, allowing developers to
avoid land-use restrictions in one municipality by moving to adjacent ones and providing
incentives for municipalities to adopt less strict land-conversion regulations to attract
households and workers. The empirical results fully support this hypothesis and unveil
significant differences between small and large cities, the effect of governance
fragmentation being a substantial factor in the latter case.
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Introduction

During the last decades, European Union (EU)
cities experienced unprecedented spatial
growth. Europe’s urbanisation level in 2018
was 74%, and it is expected to increase to
83.7% by 2050 (UN-DESA, 2018). However,
the urbanisation trend that has characterised
Europe and the US in recent years is moving in
the opposite direction with respect to the rest
of the world, where populations are growing
faster than or at the same rate of built-up areas
(Alberti et al., 2019). This means that cities
in Europe and the United States (US) are no
longer growing in height (and, then, compactly);
instead, more and more land is being converted
to accommodate new citizens. In addition,
evidence from European cities shows that
the density of urban settlements decreased,
and their discontinuity increased, especially
in small and medium-sized cities due to
shrinking populations (Guastella et al., 2019).
Many consider this growth unnecessary and
the result of market or political inefficiencies
(Downs, 2005): market fails to price the
negative externalities on the environment, and
local policymakers pay low attention to the
issue of efficient land use. Many others oppose
this view (Brueckner, 2000), claiming that landuse restrictions limit people utility, lowering
the average living space below desirable levels
(Mills, 2006) and increasing the price of houses
(Ehrlich et al., 2018). In fact, urban sprawl has
multiple benefits, such as the availability of
larger houses, easier air ventilation and lower
pollution, greater availability of green spaces,
etc. However, the costs are also high in relation

to the transformation of agricultural and
natural land at high rates, the loss of related
ecosystem services, and the push towards
car-based commuting and the related pollution.
Appendix A provides a complete overview of the
potential costs and benefits.
Several studies have investigated the drivers of
urban sprawl by looking at single cases (Couch
and Kerecha, 2006; Hewitt and Escobar, 2011;
Salvati, 2016) and cross-country and crosscity comparisons in the US (Brueckner and
Fansler, 1983; McGrath, 2005; Paulsen, 2012;
Spivey, 2008) and Europe (Patacchini and
Zenou, 2009; Schwartz, 2010; Siedentop and
Fina, 2012; Oueslati et al., 2015). The increase
in housing demand driven by demographic
trends and income growth, alongside the
increased use of cars as a prevalent mode of
transportation and low farmland values, explain
urban spatial expansion to the greatest extent,
estimated at 80% of total city size variation by
Paulsen (2012). Likewise, many studies have
looked at the effectiveness of policy measures
to contrast urban sprawl, usually focusing
on single-case scenarios and largely on the
effectiveness of containment policies and
planning tools (Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012;
Gennaio et al., 2009; Wassmer, 2006; Woo and
Guldmann, 2011; Paulsen, 2013). The results
vary from context to context, but, generally, the
effectiveness of local containment policies is
strongly related to the governance structure.
Weak governance systems within a territory
likely lead to ineffective land-use policies.
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This paper proposes an empirical cross-city
analysis of urbanisation and sprawl aimed at
disentangling the specific role of governance
and, in particular, administrative fragmentation.
The empirical framework of the paper grounds
on the empirical model firstly proposed by
Brueckner and Fansler (1983) to test the
validity of the monocentric model (Alonso,
1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1972 [AMM]). In
this model, four primary variables determine
the equilibrium size of the city: the total
population, the median household income, the
cost of commuting, and the agricultural rents
at the urban fringe. Several studies support
the validity of the monocentric city model
empirically (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983;
Deng et al., 2008; Ke et al., 2009; McGrath,
2005; Spivey, 2008; Paulsen, 2012; Oueslati
et al., 2015). Additionally, evidence suggests
that specific factors including demographics,
household preferences and emerging lifestyles,
contribute to more dispersed urban forms
(Anas et al., 1998; Brueckner, 2000; Pisman et
al., 2011; Cirtautas, 2013; Jaeger and Schwick,
2014).
General aspects related to urban governance
and, more specifically, institutional
fragmentation have been studied extensively
but rarely analysed empirically in the context of
cross-city comparisons. In his historical review
of urbanisation and suburbanisation in the US,
Teaford (1979) traces the roots of political,
cultural, and social processes that have driven
the spatial decentralisation and institutional
fragmentation of US metropolitan areas. Lewis
(1996) proposed a politico-economic analysis
of metropolitan growth patterns, pointing to the
fundamental role of institutional organisations
in the process of aggregating agents’

preferences and translating them into decisionmaking, especially when it comes to land
use. Rusk (1998) also recognised the strict
interconnection between the balkanisation of
local governance and the spatial growth of US
metropolitan cities, and suggested that only
higher level, in particular, regional agendas may
effectively respond to the many challenges of
growth management. The same conclusion was
reached by Orfield and Luce (2010) based on
a case-study analysis of the Twin Cities. They
argued that American metropolitan areas have
evolved from the simple city-suburb scheme to
more complex ‘mosaics’, with jobs and house
units dispersed across very large spaces and
governed by many local governments.
This general result suggests that more
administratively fragmented metropolitan areas
should also be characterised more by urban
sprawl. Empirical analyses of the relationship
between urban sprawl and governance
fragmentation have been carried out previously
at the county level in the US (Carruthers and
Ulfarsson, 2002) and the EU (Ehrlich et al.,
2018). Only two studies have considered
the city as a unit of analysis. Paulsen (2014)
considered institutional fragmentation among
the causes of dynamic sprawl, while Carruthers
(2003) focussed on its effects on urban growth
but only considered the fringe of the cities; both
studies considered metropolitan areas in the
US. The present work aims to fill this gap by
providing empirical evidence for EU cities.
This paper extends the Brueckner and Fansler
(1983) empirical model to consider institutional
fragmentation among the determinants of the
spatial extent of built-up metropolitan areas
in Europe. We employ 2012 Copernicus land
cover data to measure the spatial extent of a
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sample of EU Functional Urban Areas (FUAs)
with more than 50,000 inhabitants and link
this information to socio-economic indicators
suggested by the empirical literature and to a
measure of governance fragmentation, which is
the number of municipal authorities within the
FUA per thousand inhabitants. The definition of
municipal authority corresponds to levels one
or two of the European classification of Local
Administrative Units (LAU), depending on the
country. We hypothesise and empirically test
that a higher number of local governments
deciding autonomously on land use induces
larger urban expansion ceteris paribus.
The study frames into the body of literature on
the determinants of city size, to which it also
contributes in several aspects. Firstly, it focuses
on the EU, where considerably lower empirical
evidence exists on the determinants of city size
compared to the US. Secondly, it expands the
scope of the empirical analysis to small cities,
for which relatively less evidence exists about
the functioning of the monocentric model.
Finally, it allows for scale-related structural
heterogeneity identifying endogenous threshold

effects. This last contribution is relevant to
disentangle the structural differences about the
role of administrative fragmentation between
small and large cities. Our research hypothesis
is that the coordination of planning policies
becomes progressively more difficult as the size
of the metropolitan area increases and may be
a relevant issue in large areas only. However,
the threshold size at which fragmentation
shows its impact is not known a priori and
needs to be considered endogenously and,
accordingly, estimated simultaneously with the
other regression parameters.
The remaining paper is structured as follows.
The following section reviews the relevant
literature concerning the determinants of city
size, the role of institutional fragmentation,
urban spatial size and the institutional setting
of European cities. Next two sections are
dedicated to the description of the data used
and the illustration of the empirical model and
methodological approach. The empirical results
are then presented and discussed, and a final
section concludes and draws the resulting
policy implications.
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Institutional fragmentation and city size

The determinants of city size
In the urban economics tradition of the AMM
model (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills,
1972), the observed spatial size of cities
is understood as the result of population,
income, transportation costs and agricultural
land values (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983).
Combined, these factors determine the
spatial distribution of housing prices and,
consequently, the household’s location
choice. The nexus of population and income
is clear because an increase in both factors
increases the demand for houses. A decline in
transportation costs accelerates the expansion
of cities in the urban fringe where houses are
more affordable. High agricultural land values
contrast the spatial expansion of cities, making
land development relatively more costly. The
empirical literature that tested empirically the
validity of this hypothesis refers largely to the
US (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983; McGrath,
2005; Wassmer, 2006; Spivey, 2008; Paulsen,
2012), and only a minority to developing
countries (Deng et al., 2008; Song et al., 2014)
and India (Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012; Lata
et al., 2003).
In Europe, Patacchini and Zenou (2009) were
the first to present a sprawl analysis that
refers to cities in the whole EU. Arribas-Bel
et al. (2011) presented an analysis of sprawl
that matches different socioeconomic and
morphological dimensions of the phenomenon
in Europe. Schwartz (2010) analysed the urban
form of 231 European cities, looking at several

landscape metrics and their cross-correlation.
Wolff et al. (2018) compared residential density
changes between 1990–2000 and 2000–
2010 in European urban morphological zones
(UMZs), defined by the spatial continuity of
urbanisation. They found that declining density
was the main characteristic of urban spatial
expansion in Europe in both periods, although
to different extents. Guastella et al. (2019)
reached the same conclusion based on an
analysis of European FUAs for the period 1990–
2014, adding that the sprawl characteristics of
low density and high discontinuity are typical of
small and shrinking cities in Europe. Salvati et
al. (2018) used explanatory statistical analysis
to profile land consumption patterns of 155
metropolitan regions, matching land-use data
with information about the socio-economic
characteristics of the cities.
All the previous literature about urban sprawl in
Europe approaches the topic with descriptive
analyses aimed at representing sprawl or, in
some cases, classifying cities according to the
identified sprawl patterns, without deepening
the investigation into the determinants of urban
spatial size. Conversely, Oueslati et al. (2015)
employed two different indexes of sprawl to
explain the determinants of urban sprawl.
Their results are consistent with those that
emerged in the US concerning the validity of the
monocentric model.
Beyond the tradition of urban economics
literature, other factors have been related
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to the spatial expansion of cities. Fujita and
Thisse (2002) argued that cities specialised in
sectors that benefit most from agglomeration
economies tend to be less dispersed. Saiz
(2010) provided evidence that geographical
factors influencing the amount of land that can
be developed also drive housing demand and,
consequently, sub-urbanisation patterns. The
average cost of fuel (Molloy and Shan, 2013)
and the network infrastructure also shape
households’ location decisions and, hence,
the spatial development of cities (Baum-Snow,
2007). Cavailhès et al. (2004) and Coisnon et
al. (2014) linked households’ living decisions
with the value of rural amenities, especially
agricultural amenities. This evidence is relevant
to explain not only the fast suburbanisation of
many modern cities but also the occurrence of
so-called leapfrogging development.

Institutions, policies and sprawl
Institutions and policies play a substantial role
in determining households’ location decisions,
and the final effect on sprawl depends mostly
on their interaction. Tiebout (1956) confuted
the analysis on the level of national and
federal expenditures on public goods provided
by Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson (1954),
claiming that such a theoretical framework
does not apply to local expenditures, which
entail a shift in the decision-maker agent from
the national government to the consumervoter.1 He proposed the idea of households
‘voting with their feet’ to describe location
choices depending on local public policies,
including fiscal and land development policies.
Local authorities, in fact, finance the provision
of public services, using resources raised
with local taxation in addition to transfers
from central authorities, thereby generating a
heterogeneous supply of taxes and services

that favours sorting among municipalities in
the same metropolitan area. The institutional
setting of a metro area, however, largely
influences the outcome of this sorting (Ehrlich
et al., 2018). Fragmented and decentralised
settings, allowing for a higher degree of
autonomy at the local level, are characterised
by higher competition among municipalities,
which can hardly be on tax policies.2 Instead,
local governments compete using landdevelopment policies. Sometimes, these
policies are aimed at protecting the value of
houses in a specific site by limiting growth but,
together, originate a growth of artificial area
that shifts from site to site and results in urban
sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002). In
other circumstances, these policies are aimed
at encouraging growth through lower land-use
regulations and leveraging on the relatively low
price of land.
Another channel through which institutional
settings and local policies determine urban
sprawl is zoning, whereby households
self-select zones that are homogeneous
with respect to residents’ socio-economic
conditions (Shertzer et al., 2018). Although
also very common in most European countries,
the meaning of zoning differs significantly
between the US and Europe (Hirt, 2007, 2012,
2013). Generally, zoning is applied to provide
public regulations that limit private-sector
activity in terms of building options in the
territory’s subdivisions. However, in Europe,
these regulations mainly concern building
characteristics, (height, colour, architectural
style, etc.), while in the US, zoning pertains
exclusively to the functions those buildings
perform (Hirt, 2012, 2013). Zoning with respect
to function is also pursued in most European
countries, but mixed uses are always allowed.
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What matters in Europe is the proportion in
which residential and commercial buildings are
found (Hall, 2006).
Since the 1960s, zoning has been harshly
criticised because of social and ecological
concerns. Residents have an incentive
to get policies enacted that emphasise
land-use restrictions, limiting land use in
the zone to preserve the value of houses
(Albouy and Ehrlich, 2018). The limits to the
development of new land together with the
high prices of homes refrain lower income
households from moving into the periphery,
consequently characterising low-density
housing (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013).
This contributes to increased segregation of
populations by class and race (Frug, 1996)
and, by strongly encouraging car use, to
favour sprawl and intensified pollution and
land waste (Kleppel, 2002). These effects
are more likely to appear in very fragmented
and decentralised institutional settings: the
smaller the size of the community, the higher
the control on political groups and the easier
the implementation of rules that increase
residential values (Carruthers, 2003). Thus,
institutional fragmentation facilitates zoning,
and despite promoting the enforcement of
strict land-use policies in single municipalities,
it favours the spread of low densities in
the suburbs at the aggregate level. This is
confirmed by the differences in the allocation
of land-use planning powers between the US
and European countries, where the former
is much more decentralised than the latter
(Hirt, 2012). Additionally, huge differences
exist among EU MS: for instance, the United
Kingdom is the most centralised country in
Europe while Mediterranean countries are the
most decentralised. However, in all European

countries, the national government plays a
role in land-use planning, although marginal
in some cases. Conversely, in the US, land
use is not really planned, as the whole system
is grounded on zoning at the local level (Hall,
2002).
The last consideration concerns the local
spillover effects of land-use policies. As argued
in Glaeser and Kahn (2004), very fragmented
and decentralised settings facilitate eluding
policies that limit land development as
developers can easily move to neighbouring
municipalities with looser regulations. Thus,
policies that put boundaries on the growth
of developed land are found to be effective
if managed in aggregate metropolitan areas
(Cunningham, 2007). Conversely, when
urban containment policies are enacted at
the local level, evidence suggests that land
development concentrates outside the urban
core, generating sprawl (Brueckner and
Sridhar, 2012). Paradoxically, policies aimed at
containing urban growth at the local level may
produce the opposite effect in neighbourhoods
that, depending on their magnitude, may
even generate a positive net effect on urban
development at the aggregate level (Irwin and
Bockstael, 2004).

The institutional setting of cities
in the EU
Decisions concerning land use at the city
level, both explicitly and implicitly, also affect
all neighbouring communities, because of the
many implications on other sectoral issues (e.g.
housing, transportation, environment, tourism,
etc.). Furthermore, in cities or metropolitan
areas where the number of administrative
entities equipped with competence on land
use is high, a lack of coordination leaves little
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scope for efficient and sustainable spatial
development. Most metropolitan areas have a
corresponding metropolitan authority, but only
a few are endowed with effective administrative
powers (Ahrend et al., 2014). Metropolitan
areas should be integrated into urban
governance as functional bodies to allow an
integrated evaluation of sectoral policies while
staying close to citizens. In this regard, the
formalisation of FUAs (OECD, 2012) in Europe is
the first step, as they avoid confusion generated
by different definitions of metropolitan cities,
allowing direct comparisons between different
areas. However, they are merely statistical
entities, while the administrative functions,
including land-use planning, are still subject to
municipalities’ decision-making.

often provide only policy guidelines (OECD,
2017). Regional plans, where they exist, are
more detailed than national ones and are
usually oriented towards strategic planning.
Metropolitan plans are very rare and prepared
for single metropolitan areas, such as in
Copenhagen, Auckland, Dublin, London and
Budapest. The Territorial Coherence Scheme
in France represents the only case in Europe
where metropolitan plans are arranged for
every metropolitan area of the country (OECD,
2017). Municipal plans are the most detailed
and binding plans in all European countries.
They contain elements of boundary plans and
encompass a broad range of policy fields,
aiming to define the intended use of a clear
portion of land (OECD, 2017).

Land-use plans can be divided into three
categories depending on their function:
policy guidelines, strategic plans and zoning/
boundary plans. Policy guidelines are very
general, referring to vast territories (usually
national ones) and lacking geographic
references. Strategic plans identify main
policy challenges but remain general enough
to allow a high flexibility in the choice of policy
instrument. Zoning/boundary plans specify
in detail the type of land use that is intended
or permitted for a given location and typically
contain the only binding rules for landowners.
However, all plans can have more than one
function simultaneously. Notwithstanding
the considerable differences across EU MS,
higher governmental levels usually provide
plans containing general guidelines, while
the narrower the controlled area, the wider
and more binding are the authority’s powers.
Indeed, the national government and/or the
federal states usually produce integrated plans
that cover a broad range of policy fields and

Although municipalities handle land-use
planning in all European countries, different
degrees of coordination with and supervision of
cities or regions occur. For instance, in Austria,
the national government prepares the Austrian
Spatial Development Concept, which must be
jointly approved by the nine federal states and
2,100 municipalities. The Austrian Conference
for Spatial Planning coordinates land-planning
decisions at all government levels. In addition
to Austria, only another eight European
countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden)
envisage a certain degree of coordination
among municipalities when drawing up regional
plans (Farinós Dasi, 2007). In contrast, in
countries like Poland, where the hierarchical
planning system is only on paper since the
only binding zoning plans are the Local Spatial
Development Plans, plans are drawn up at the
municipal level by the 2,478 Gminas (OECD,
2017).
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Differences in local governance typologies
among EU MS are also dictated by the different
spatial planning systems in place.3 CEC (1997)
identified four prevailing spatial planning
systems found in the then 15 EU countries:
i) urbanism tradition, ii) land-use spatial
planning, iii) regional economic approach and
iv) comprehensive integrated approach. The
ESPON project carried out by Farinós Dasí and
Milder (2007) extended the analysis of the
CEC (1997) to include all 27 EU countries as
well as changes in spatial planning systems
occurring in each country. This classification
is neither static nor exclusive, as in many
countries several systems coexist (Farinós
Dasí and Milder, 2007). European countries
have had, for decades, a long tradition of
‘urbanism’, characterised by a preventive
binding zoning and assignment of land-use
rights at the local level, where the only decision
criterion is conformity with the plan (Janin
Rivolin, 2017). However, the proliferation of
laws and regulations has favoured private
speculation and privatisation of vast urban
soils to the detriment of public interest (Janin
Rivolin, 2017) and effective control of urban
development (CEC, 1997). Thus, this system
has been abandoned by the vast majority
of European countries but remains firmly in
place in Mediterranean countries. Conversely,
the land-use spatial planning system that
originated in the UK is aimed at controlling the

path of change in urban development, with a
focus on sustainable growth (Farinós Dasí and
Milder, 2007). Accordingly, any assignation of
land-use right is discretionary (Booth, 2003)
and subject to specific evaluations by local
authorities, under the supervision of central
administration. This guarantees coherence with
the overall spatial development strategy and
not merely conformity with the plan’s criteria
(Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002; Janin Rivolin,
2017). The power exercised by local authorities
is drastically reduced in the regional economic
approach and in the comprehensive integrated
approach. Countries belonging to the former
usually have a hierarchical distribution of
competencies, where territorial development is
based on regional plans drawn up by either the
regions or the national government. Through the
pursuit of spatial justice, these plans address
issues relevant for the whole region, including
environmental, social and economic concerns,
and are executed by authorities at the local
level (CEC, 1997). Finally, in countries adopting
the comprehensive integrated approach, both
vertical and horizontal coordination can be
found between all sectors and institutions
dealing with spatial development (CEC,
1997; Farinós Dasí and Milder, 2007). Table
1 summarises the spatial planning system
existing in each EU country (where, for each
system, countries highlighted in bold have that
system as their prevalent one):

Table 1: Prevalent spatial planning systems in EU countries
Urbanism

Land Use Planning

Regional Economic Approach

Comprehensive Integrated
Approach

Cyprus, Greece*, Italy*, Malta,
Spain*

Belgium*, Cyprus*, Czech
Republic*, Ireland*,
Luxembourg*, Malta*, Portugal,
Spain, UK*

France*, Germany*, Hungary*,
Ireland, Latvia*, Lithuania*,
Sweden, Slovakia*, Portugal*,
UK

Austria*, Belgium, Bulgaria*,
Denmark*, Estonia*, Finland*,
France, Germany*, Hungary*,
Ireland, Latvia*, Lithuania*,
Luxembourg, Netherlands*,
Poland*, Romania*, Slovenia*,
Slovakia*, Sweden*, UK

Source: Farinós Dasí and Milder, 2007

FEEM REPORTS

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1296

| 9

10

Cappelli et al.: Institutional Fragmentation and Urbanisation in the EU Citie

In short, if decentralising land-use planning
is advantageous in terms of flexibility and
closeness to the community’s needs,
decentralisation in the absence of effective
coordination can produce adverse effects and
create conflict with the objectives set at the
national/regional levels (OECD, 2017) or in
neighbouring communities. Although regulatory
frameworks and the degree of interaction
between different authorities vary across

countries, the common tract of European
planning policies is the municipalities’ direct
power to decide on land-use change by
identifying zones suitable for converting from
natural or agricultural to urbanised areas. Since
each municipality counts as a single decision
centre, the number of municipalities within
a city may effectively proxy the complexity
of urban governance, making the measure
suitable for our empirical analysis.
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Data

The dataset employed considers 359 European
FUAs, our unit of observation, for which data is
available. In Europe, a clear and harmonised
definition of ‘city’ was lacking until very
recently. Later, the EU-OECD classification was
adopted, defining a city as a densely inhabited
core surrounded by a less densely populated
commuting zone, whose labour market is highly
integrated with the city. The core centres are
identified based on gridded population data
and consist of continuous clusters of cells
with population densities larger than 1,500
inhabitants. The hinterlands are defined based
on commuting data: a municipality is part
of the FUA if at least 15% of the residents
work in the urban core. The sample is largely
heterogeneous in terms of population size and
covers a wide variety of city typologies, ranging
from highly populated capitals to second-tier
metropolitan areas and highly industrialised
cities to smaller coastal or historical towns.
Table 2 describes the model variables and
provides basic descriptive statistics. The
dependent variable, (UA), is the total artificial
area (artificial surface) in an FUA and was
retrieved from the Corine Land Cover database
2012.4 The explanatory variables are divided
into two groups. The first group includes the
variables suggested by the related economic
and econometric literature (Brueckner and
Fansler, 1983; Wassmer, 2006; Spivey, 2008;
Paulsen, 2012; Oueslati et al. 2015), namely
population, median income, agricultural land
values and transport costs.

The population, sourced from the Eurostat
city database, is measured in thousands
of inhabitants (POP). We use per-capita
gross domestic product (GDP), sourced from
the same database, as a proxy for median
income (INC). Eurostat does not provide
city-level information on agricultural land
values; hence, we use the agricultural value
added per employee, a measure of average
productivity in the agricultural sector that
is only available at the Nomenclature Units
for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) level III (subregional administrations) territorial detail, as
the best proxy for agricultural land values (ALV).
Following Glaeser and Kahn (2004), the inverse
of the number of cars per inhabitant is included
to proxy transport costs (TC), assuming that
the diffusion of cars makes commuting
easier, fostering urban spatial expansion.
We are aware that this is an imperfect proxy
for transportation costs, because it does
not consider the availability of alternative
transportation modes and, specifically,
access to public transportation networks.
Unfortunately, the lack of comparable data for
the supply of public transportation services at
the EU level impedes controlling the regression
estimates. This misspecification likely causes
an upward bias in the estimation of the TC
parameter because in large metropolitan
areas fewer people are willing to use private
transportation simply because alternative
modes are easier and more convenient to
use. However, this should not affect the other
parameter estimates.
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The second group of variables covers
our research hypothesis (administrative
fragmentation) and control variables. The
measure of administrative fragmentation is
based on the official definition of boundaries
provided by the geographical information
system of the European Commission (GISCOEUROSTAT). We construct this measure by
superimposing the map of the FUA on that of
the municipalities (communes) and computing
the number of administrative units within the
FUA (FRAG). The absolute measure is divided
by the FUA’s population to be comparable
across units of different sizes in the sample
and to avoid spurious correlations between
the total sizes of cities and their number of
governments. The spatial scope of functional
relations in European cities, especially large
cities, likely extended over time to neighbouring
municipalities due to lowering transport costs
and agglomeration effects, causing today’s
FUAs to be large in terms of built-up area
and administratively fragmented. As control
variables, we include the (log of) distance from
the nearest capital (lnDIST) and the degree
of polycentrism (POLY). The distance from
the capital city is computed as the Haversine
distance between the geographical centroid
of the FUA and the centroid of the nearest
capital and captures the geographical and
hierarchical relations between cities. The
degree of polycentrism is computed as the

share of people living outside the urban core.
The original monocentric theoretical construct
of the AMM model does not trustfully reproduce
the reality of modern cities, especially large
urban agglomerations, where secondary poles
have emerged alongside the spatial expansion
of the main urban cores. The share of people
living outside the main core is expected to
account for the dispersion that likely generates
a larger urban development ceteris paribus. In
addition to the share of people living outside
the core, we considered an alternative measure
of polycentrism proposed by Meijers et al.
(2018), which takes into account the spatial
distribution and geographical concentration of
people in a more rigorous manner compared
to the dualism between core and non-core.
However, considering the nature of the spatial
unit of observation in this work, the FUA, the
measure shows two drawbacks that eventually
led us not to include the variable in the model.
The first is that being a Helfindhal-type index
measure, an artificially high number of FUAs
with little municipalities show the highest
values of spatial concentration and are, hence,
considered strongly monocentric, even though
the core is made by a single municipality.
The second is that the measure is strongly
correlated with the governance fragmentation,
causing collinearity issues in the regression
model.
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Table 2: Description of variables and summary statistics
Variable

Variable description

Mean

SD

UA

Total artificial area (CLC 1), km2 - Urban Atlas 2012

239.513

315.280

POP

Total population (1,000 inhabitants) - Urban Audit

549.556

1100.558

INC

Gross domestic product per inhabitant, 100 euro - Urban Audit

266.332

122.336

FRAG

Number of FUA municipalities per 1,000 inhabitants – authors’ calculation based on
GISCO official boundary files

0.340

0.359

TC

Inverse of the number of private cars per inhabitant – Urban Audit

0.274

0.115

ALV

Agriculture value-added per employee, 100 euro - Eurostat (NUTS III)

62.872

142.638

POLY

Percentage of people living outside the core city

0.434

0.181

lnDIST

log of the Haversine distance from the FUA centroid to the nearest capital centroid, km –
authors’ calculation based on GISCO official boundary files

7.047

1.569

IAPS

Number of artificial patches over total artificial area in the FUA

73.125

22.568

DISC

Percentage of discontinuous urban fabric

0.792

0.111

DEV

Percentage of developed land on total developed and developable land

0.738

0.157

The dependent variable is constructed using
CLC data from the year 2012, and all the
explanatory variables that vary with time refer
to the same year or the preceding year when
2012 is not available. Only the POP variable
makes an exception, which is measured in
years 2009–2010, to avoid any simultaneity
bias that may occur because the availability
of houses that follows an urban spatial
expansion may attract new households through
the mechanism of lower average prices,
reverting the hypothesised causality between
population and the spatial extent of cities.
Simultaneity bias is not expected to affect the
other variables of the model, which are either
measured as regional averages, as with income
and land price variables and, hence, not
affected by the single city land-use dynamics,
or, as in the case of transport costs related to
culture, lifestyles and network infrastructures,
which may be considered strictly exogenous.
In the empirical section of the paper, we test
the robustness of our result using different
specifications and, among others, alternative
dependent variables (summary tables with
results are in Appendix C). The choice of the
total urbanised area is dictated by the use of

the Brueckner and Fansler (1983) empirical
model, but administrative fragmentation
may also impact other aspects of the urban
development, in particular, those related to the
spatial distribution of built-up areas. We define
three measures of urban sprawl, both derived
from land cover data and commonly used to
describe the morphological characteristics
of urbanisation (Schwarz, 2010). The first is
the number of patches of artificial area (1 in
the CLC classification) over the total area or
the inverse of the average patch size (IAPS).
The indicator represents the morphological
fragmentation of the city caused by alternating
urban areas and agricultural and natural
spaces. The second (DISC) is the percentage
of discontinuous urban fabric (112 in the CLC
classification) on the total residential area
(11 in the CLC classification). Urban fabric
is considered discontinuous when less than
80% of the space of its cells is occupied by
impermeable features (buildings, roads and
artificially surfaced areas). Accordingly, the
variable measures the intensity of sprawling
patterns. The third (DEV) is the percentage
of artificial land (1 in the CLC classification)
over the total developed and developable
land (1 and 2 in the CLC classification). All
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the agricultural land, including arable land,
land for permanent crops, land for pastures,
and other land is considered developable,
although we know that the development of
these different types of land also has different
costs. The measure expresses the degree
of urbanisation in relation to its possibility

frontier. By construction, a high value of each
measure indicates a wider urban sprawl, and
we expect to find a positive relationship with
the administrative fragmentation accordingly.
The three-level CLC classification is described
in detail in Appendix B.
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04

Methodology

We borrow the empirical specification from
Brueckner and Fansler (1983), who linked the
actual spatial size of cities to its determinants
(1)

UA = β0 + β1POP + β2INC + β3TC + β4AGRI + ε

where UA is the vector of the spatial extent of
urbanised areas, while the regressors POP,
INC, TC and AGRI stand for the total population,
average household income, transport costs
and agricultural land values, respectively. The
assumption of the monocentric model being
valid, we expect β1 > 0; β2 > 0; β3 < 0; β4.< 0.
(2)

described in the AMM framework. The model
takes the form in equation 1:

We augment the model in equation 1 including
the FRAG variable to capture the effect of
administrative fragmentation on land use. The
augmented model, in equation 2, also controls
for the (log of the) distance from the capital
(lnDist) and the degree of polycentrism (POLY).

UA = β0 + β1POP + β2INC + β3TC + β4ALV + β5GFRAG + β6POLY + β7 ln DIST + ε

We look at the estimated β5 to test the
hypothesis that more fragmented metropolitan
areas consume more land on average and
other things being equal. We expect this
coefficient to be positive and statistically
significant. About the relationship with control
variables, we expect the coefficients of lnDIST
and POLY to be lower and greater than zero,
respectively. In the first case, we expect a
negative relationship because capital cities are
on average larger than other cities and because
their growth certainly influences neighbouring
cities but closer cities more. In the second
case, we expect a positive relationship because
the average density of the population tends
to be lower in cities where more people live
outside the core.

Based on the discussion of existing literature in
the second section it is reasonable to believe
that all the effects that shape the relationship
between administrative fragmentation and land
use are relevant only for large metropolitan
areas. Firstly, in small cities, people
concentrate mainly on the largest municipality
and only to a lower extent in adjacent ones.
Thus, the competition to attract residents in the
suburbs is lower. Secondly, the self-selection
of residents in specific areas operates at the
neighbourhood rather than at the municipality
level in smaller cities, and this neutralises the
effects of zoning on land use. Finally, spillover
effects are expected to be less relevant.
In small urban areas, land is not as scarce
a resource as in large metropolitan areas,
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and each municipality has little incentive to
implement strict land-use regulations. It follows
that while the prescription of the monocentric
model is valid for both small and large urban
areas, it may be valid in a different manner.
The effect of administrative fragmentation
may differ among cities of different sizes. In
accounting for these different effects, there
are no prior indications to suggest what the
critical dimension of the FUA should be to see
changes in the impact. Thus, the standard
approach is to classify cities in different size
groups, defining arbitrary size thresholds based
on common sense and consolidated and
commonly accepted values.
The threshold regression approach we propose
departs from this logic and considers the
threshold parameters endogenous, which
means it has to be estimated alongside the
other parameters from the data. The gain of
using such an approach is twofold. The first and
most obvious is to waive the arbitrariness of the
threshold, defined using common sense and
(3)

accepted standards. For the city size hierarchy,
for instance, 5 million, 1 million, 500 thousand,
and 100 thousand are quite standard
thresholds, but may not give meaningful
insights when applied to the specific object of
governance fragmentation. The second is to
pick only relevant thresholds. The approach,
in fact, is used to estimate the threshold value
from the data, but applied recursively and using
inference can inform about the number of
thresholds to be used, avoiding an excessive,
and perhaps useless, sub-sampling of the
dataset.
To illustrate the general approach, let X be the
matrix of variables whose effects are expected
to vary across cities of different sizes and Z the
matrix of variables whose effects are expected
to be constant across the sample of cities.
Having defined a threshold variable (TV) for the
size of cities (the total population in our case),
the specification of the coefficient-varying
model can be formalised as in equation 3.

UA = θ1X1 · I(TV ≥ γ) + θ2X2 · I(TV < γ)

The equation allows different parameter
estimates, θ1 and θ2, for the two groups of
observations, respectively. One shows a
value of TV larger than or at least equal to
the threshold value, and the other does not.
The groups are identified using the indicator
function I(.).
To estimate the parameter γ jointly with the
parameters set θ1 and θ2, we rely on the
threshold regression approach (Hansen, 1996,
2000), whose procedure we briefly describe
here.

1. For each value of γ ∈ TV, estimate the
model

UA = θ1X1 · I(TV ≥ γ) + δ' Z + ε
that is equivalent to estimating the model
in equation 3, being θ1 and θ + λ and θ2 =
θ: to operationalise this step, we trim the
distribution, cutting the 5% of the values lying
in the two tails to avoid generating too small
sub-samples;
After estimating each model, we collect the
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concentrated sum of squared errors S(θ,γ,λ)
and the estimator γ̂1 of the first threshold γ1 is
the value of γ that minimises S(γ) = S(θ,γ,λ);
3.
To obtain a confidence interval for γ, we
construct the LR statistic
LR =

n S (γ) - S (γ1)
S (γ1)

n being the sample size, and compare the
statistic with the 95% confidence interval value
of 7.35 (Hansen, 2000) by line-plotting the
values of LR(γ) against the values of γ and
adding a horizontal line at 7.35: the confidence
interval is identified as the interval in which
LR(γ) <7.35.

In the specification of the threshold model,
we consider that only three variables with
an impact on urbanisation conditioned on
size, FRAG, POP, and INC. For population and
income, there is previous empirical evidence
showing size-related effects (Paulsen, 2012).
Concerning administrative fragmentation, the
review of existing theoretical and empirical
literature in the second section supports this
hypothesis. The remaining variables are not
expected to show an impact conditioned on
size. However, since this a discretional choice,
its validity is tested empirically (results in the
appendix) also to assess the robustness of the
results.
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Results

Table 3 shows the results of the regression
models with and without the threshold effect.
The first set of results concerns the model
without the threshold, estimated on the full
sample of 359 European FUAs for which
all the data were available. Consistent with
all the previous literature, the estimated
coefficients for population and income were
both positive and statistically significant. An
increase of 1,000 inhabitants, other things
being equal, results in a rise in the artificial
area by 0.24 km2. This amount is lower by
a magnitude of one-third compared to the
estimate in Paulsen (2012), and we attribute
this to the structural differences between
the EU and the US, with EU cities traditionally
more compact (Schneider and Woodcock,
2008). The estimate is larger compared to
those in Oueslati et al. (2015), who provided
an elasticity estimate of 0.17. Using the sample
averages reported in their table, POP=939:8 (in
thousands of inhabitants) and UA=211:41 (in
km2), the elasticity translates into a marginal
consumption of land per 1,000 inhabitants six
times smaller compared to ours. We exclude
that the difference in the estimated coefficient
is due to the inclusion of additional variables in
our model, as we estimate the linear regression
also using the Brueckner and Fansler (1983)
variables only, and the estimated marginal
land consumption increases from just 0.24
to 0.25. Instead, this difference is a result
of the sampling, because we include in our
sample all the FUAs with 50,000 to 100,000
inhabitants and existing empirical evidence

(Guastella et al., 2017) demonstrates that small
cities have, on average, higher marginal land
consumptions.
An increase in the average GDP by 100 euros
produces approximately half the effect on the
total artificial area of a population increase by
1,000 inhabitants. Although the income effect
may appear surprisingly high, it is worth noting
that it is coherent with the estimates provided
in previous studies, including Paulsen (2012). In
addition, the high value of this coefficient may
well represent the higher land consumption
for non-residential purposes induced by a
high GDP level. The estimated transport costs
coefficient is negative, consistent with previous
theoretical and empirical literature and
statistically different from zero. The coefficient
related to agricultural land values is correctly
sloped but not statistically significant. The POLY
coefficient is not statistically different from 0
and, contrary to our intuition that cities where
people live outside the core are larger because
the average density is lower, negatively sloped.
This suggests that in larger cities, the share of
people living in the core is higher. We obtain
the same result (not shown) in terms of slope
and significance when using an alternative
measure of polycentricity that overcomes the
core-periphery dualism and looks at the spatial
distribution of populations, such as that used in
Meijers at al. (2018). A negative and significant
effect is found for the distance from the capital
city, consistent with our expectations. Results
about governance fragmentation support our
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research hypothesis: an increase in the number
of municipalities per thousand inhabitants
leads to a spatial expansion of the urbanised
area. This effect is estimated at 25.59 km2 per
additional municipality holding constant the
total population and is statistically significant

at a 5% level. Overall, including the main
variables suggested by the monocentric model
framework, an indicator of administrative
fragmentation, and our controls, the covariates
explain 87% of the total variance of the spatial
extent of cities.

Table 3: Linear and threshold regression models for the urbanised area, EU cities, 2012
No-threshold

Threshold

Threshold and country fixed effects

TC

-198.902**
(80.678)

-193.315** (88.614)

9.551
(153.036)

ALV

-0.026
(0.045)

-0.042
(0.031)

-0.008
(0.025)

POLY

-41.911
(57.554)

-86.914
(62.693)

2.296
(101.280)

lnDIST

-22.760***
(8.672)

-18.723**
(8.319)

-17.714**
(8.912)

TV< 1

T V1

TV< 1

T V1

Intercept

295.563***
(98.151)

242.099**
(101.104)

252.965
(198.074)

133.046
(157.438)

139.702
(238.464)

POP

0.241***
(0.016)

0.358***
(0.028)

0.194***
(0.018)

0.394***
(0.025)

0.207***
(0.017)

INC

0.141**
(0.063)

0.086**
(0.029)

0.563*
(0.308)

-0.106
(0.081)

0.364
(0.314)

FRAG

25.595**
(12.829)

52.515*
(12.323)

1136.542***
(292.987)

31.077**
(15.308)

1062.695***
(249.632)

911.8
conf int

911.8

[887.6; 1079.82]

[874.2; 971.03]

Adj:R2

0.87

0.98

0.98

Country
dummy

NO

NO

YES

Notes to table: Robust SE in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels

Table 3 also presents the estimation results
of two threshold models, the second of which
includes country dummies in the specification.
In both models, the threshold size is estimated
at γ̂1 =911.8 thousands of inhabitants in
the FUA and, based on the 95% confidence
interval estimates, the threshold is statistically
significant. As for control variables, few
differences exist between the model without
and the one without the threshold, as all
coefficients in the threshold model keep the
slope, magnitude and significance of the model
without threshold effects. Instead, there are
substantial differences between the threshold

models when including country dummy
variables. In particular, the TC coefficient turns
positive and insignificant. The explanation is
that country fixed effects capture, among other
things, culture and lifestyle-related household
preferences for transport and mobility, which
also affect the urbanisation patterns of cities
and cars as primary transport vehicles.
Looking at the threshold-dependent variables,
relatively small differences exist between
the models with and without the country
dummies, but substantial differences appear
when comparing the models with and
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without threshold effects. Firstly, the impact
of population is higher in FUAs below the
threshold. This means that the marginal land
consumption per new household is greater
in smaller metropolitan areas. Precisely, an
increase by 1,000 inhabitants in a large FUA
causes an increase in the spatial extent of
the urban area of 0.19 km2. The estimated
figure for smaller FUAs is 0.36, 84% larger. The
estimated difference is even larger, almost
double, when considering country-specific
effects. Secondly, the income effect is higher
in FUAs above the threshold. An increase in the
average FUA income of 100 euros determines
an increase in the spatial extent of the FUA of
0.086 km2 if the FUA is small and seven times
higher if the FUA is large. When considering
country dummy, however, both income-related
coefficients turn insignificant. Finally, the effect
of administrative fragmentation is much higher
in large FUAs compared to small ones. In the
latter group, the coefficient is also statistically
significant only at the 10% level, even though it
becomes more when including country dummy
in the threshold regression.
Comparing the results of the models with and
without the threshold effects, the change in
coefficient magnitude is worth discussing.
For both population and income-related
coefficients, the full sample estimate lies

between the estimates based on the two
sub-samples in the threshold regression. This
evidence provides a clear indication that the
full sample estimate somehow averages the
two sub-sample estimates, which are either
overestimated or underestimated. In the
case of the coefficient related to governance
fragmentation, the full sample estimate
underestimates the sub-sample ones in
both cases. This evidence provides further
support for the need to account for size-related
structural heterogeneity when considering
the relationship between urbanisation and
administrative fragmentation.
The significance of the threshold parameter and
the evidence of structural heterogeneity invite a
search for a second threshold. Considering the
already limited number of observations in the
TV ≥ γ̂1 subsample, we search for the second
threshold on the left of γ̂1. Applying the same
procedure to this sub-sample, we are able to
estimate the second threshold γ̂2=526, but
this threshold cannot be considered further:
more than 90% of the values of TV are part
of the estimated confidence interval for γ̂2 in
the range [111; 837]. In addition, a test on
the hypothesis of structural heterogeneity
within this sub-sample does not allow rejecting
the null hypothesis of no difference in the
coefficient estimates between the two groups.
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06

Concluding remarks

Cities are the engines of growth and the
catalysts of Europe’s economic and social
development, but urbanisation and the
expansion of artificial areas bring adverse
environmental effects caused by land-use
transformation and, simultaneously, require
substantial infrastructure investments
to guarantee efficient alternatives to carbased commuting. When these services
are not provided, expansion translates into
car-dependent, longer and more frequent
commuting with even worse environmental
effects. However, people demand more space
to live in larger houses, and measures aimed
at reducing land consumption are at risk of
lowering people utility below desirable levels at
best and making housing unaffordable in the
worst scenario.
This paper frames into the stream of empirical
literature aimed at better understanding the
determinants of urbanisation and emphasises
the role of governance fragmentation in
combination with city size. Using EU data on
FUAs, we try to respond to the question of
whether more fragmented governance leads
to more rapid urbanisation, other things being
equal. In summary, the answer is yes. However,
evidence suggests that this effect is much
higher in large metropolitan areas, cities with
approximately more than 1 million inhabitants,
compared to relatively smaller cities.
Metropolitan cities that are less fragmented
from the institutional point of view enjoy
significant efficiency benefits in terms of land

consumption.
From the policy perspective, this result cannot
be translated into an indication to reduce
the number of municipalities in metropolitan
cities. Instead, the problem with excessive
institutional or administrative fragmentation
is that it increases competition among
municipalities, encourages zoning and the
spreading of suburbs, and makes land-use
restrictions less effective. Policy actions aimed
at containing urban development should
promote better coordination of the different
levels of government at the metropolitan scale
to curtail the planning practices that fuel
urban sprawl while continuing to encourage
traditional instruments for more sustainable
urbanisation patterns, such as investing in
public infrastructures, vehicle sharing, and
electricity-based commuting.
The issue still requires better understanding,
and significant aspects of the mechanism
through which better governance may ensure
adequate land development still need to be
explored. For instance, the question remains
whether the creation of a central administrative
body at the FUA level is the solution to balance
the excessive fragmentation, or if a simple coordination of planning policies mediated by a
metropolitan agency can be effective, being the
latter more feasible to implement.
Another issue unexplored in the paper but
deserving attention is the connection between
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land-use planning and other policies, such as
those on taxation and mobility. Coordination
of fiscal policies limiting the use of land
development charges to finance current
expenditures may alone reduce competition
for land. Likewise, coordination of transport

policies aimed at lowering car-dependency may
undoubtedly affect the creation of suburbs and
the spread of leapfrog urban development.
The increasing availability of urban-level data
certainly has the potential to boost research in
this direction.
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Endnotes
1 In Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson (1954), consumer-voter’s preferences are given, and the central
government adjusts the revenue and expenditure pattern to them. At the local level, the municipalities’
revenue and expenditure patterns are given, and the consumer-voter chooses the municipality that best fits
his set of preferences.
2 In contrast, strong evidence exists of tax mimicking among neighbouring municipalities (Bocci et al., 2017).
3 CEC (1997) defines spatial planning systems as ‘the various institutional arrangements for expressing
spatial planning objectives and the mechanisms employed for realising them’.
4 According to the CLC classification, the aggregate ‘1-Urban Area’ comprises all artificial surfaces, including
urban fabric, industrial, commercial and transport units, mine, dump and construction sites, and artificial
non-agricultural vegetated areas.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Summary review of existing studies reporting about the positive (Benefits) and negative (Costs) effects of dispersed
urban form, by outcome type
Outcome

Potential costs and benefits

Productivity

COSTS: Impossibility to create agglomeration economies, firms’ networks and interactions decrease
productivity and innovation levels [Neuman, 2005; Maskell & Malmberg, 2007; Jones et al., 2010; OECD,
2012b]

Value of space

COSTS: Both demand-side (e.g. lower productivity and services availability) and supply-side (e.g. abundance
of land) factors decrease the value of usable space and land [Alexander, 1993; Churchman, 1999; Glaeser et
al., 2001; Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Epple et al., 2010; Knox, 2011]

Job accessibility

COSTS: Longer trip length, less public transport connectivity [Burton, 2001; Boussauw, Neutens & Witlox,
2012]
BENEFITS: Less road congestion [Burton, 2000]

Public services

COSTS: Impossibility of implementing scale economies [Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2003; Matsumoto, 2011]

Social equity

COSTS: Increases segregation [Burton, 2001; Burton et al., 2003; Cassiers & Kesteloot, 2012]

Safety

COSTS: Less surveillance and street lighting [Farrington & Welsh, 2008; Braga & Weisburd, 2010; Tang, 2015]
BENEFITS: Lower number of crimes [Burchell et al., 1998; Burton, 2000; Chhetri et al., 2013]

Open space
preservation and
biodiversity

COSTS: Higher fragmentation of habitats outside city limits; reduced soil capacity to provide ecosystem
services [Cervero, 2001; Burton et al., 2003; Dieleman & Wegener, 2004; Alberti, 2005, European
Environment Agency and European Commission, 2006, Mcdonald et al., 2008, Turbe et al., 2010; Seto et al.,
2012, Siedentop and Fina, 2012]
BENEFITS: Increased open space and biodiversity within city limits [Burton, 2001; Neuman, 2005; Ikin et al.,
2013; Wolsink, 2016]

Air pollution

COSTS: Higher pollution emissions [Stone, 2008; Schweitzer & Zou, 2010; Echenique et al., 2012; Berrigan et
al., 2014, Creutzig, 2014]
BENEFITS: Lower concentration of air pollutants in densely populated areas [Burton, 2000]

Energy efficiency

COSTS: Lower buildings and single-family houses are usually less energy efficient [Gordon & Richardson,
1997; Verlinden & Rooijers, 1998; Neuman, 2005; Ewing & Rong, 2008; OECD, 2012]

Traffic flow

COSTS: Longer trips; increased car-dependency; reduced walkability and cyclability [Newman & Kenworthy,
1996; Cervero, 2001; Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Dieleman & Wegener, 2004; Ewing, Pendall & Chen, 2003;
Bart, 2010; Zolnik, 2011; Holcombe & Williams, 2012]
BENEFITS: Lower road congestion; lower number of traffic fatalities [Burchell et al., 1998; Ewing, Schieber &
Zegeer, 2003; Burton et al., 2003; Ewing, Pendall, and Chen, 2003; Dieleman & Wegener, 2004; Zolnik, 2011;
Holcombe & Williams, 2012]

Sustainable mode
choice

COSTS: Lower share of walking and cycling because of longer average trip length; lower share of public
transport because discontinuous areas are more difficult to serve [Thomas & Cousins, 1996; Churchman,
1999; Burton, 2000; Echenique & Saint, 2001; Neuman, 2005]

Health

COSTS: Physical inactivity, obesity, heart disease, cancer prevalence [Ewing et al., 2003; Kelly-Schwartz et al.,
2004; Kim et al., 2006; Cho et al., 2006; Doyle et al., 2006; Ewing, Brownson & Berrigan, 2006; Plantinga &
Bernell, 2007; Joshu et al., 2008; Fan & Song, 2009; Lee, Ewing & Sesso, 2009; Kostova, 2011; Griffin et al.,
2012]
BENEFITS: Positive health effects due to lower density of road traffic and number of accidents [Troy, 1996;
Burton, 2000; WHO, 2011]

Wellbeing

COSTS: Limited access to services and amenities, lower consumption variety [Churchman, 1999; Burton,
2000; 2002; Bonfantini, 2013; Schiff, 2015]
BENEFITS: Reflection of consumer preferences for low-density living; more domestic space (due to lower rent),
higher sense of community [Wiersinga, 1997; Burchell et al., 1998; Neuman, 2005; Bruegmann, 2005]

FEEM REPORTS

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1296

| 29

30

Cappelli et al.: Institutional Fragmentation and Urbanisation in the EU Citie

Appendix B
Table B1: 3 level Corine Land Cover classification
Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

1 Artificial surfaces

11 Urban fabric

111 Continuous urban fabric
112 Discontinuous urban fabric

12 Industrial, commercial

121 Industrial or commercial and transport units
122 Road and rail networks and associated land
123 Port areas
124 Airports

13 Mine, dump and construction sites

131 Mineral extraction sites
132 Dump sites
133 Construction sites

14 Artificial, non-agricultural vegetated
areas

141 Green urban areas
142 Sport and leisure facilities

2 Agricultural areas

21 Arable land

211 Non-irrigated arable land
212 Permanently irrigated land
213 Rice fields

22 Permanent crops

221 Vineyards
222 Fruit trees and berry plantations
223 Olive groves

23 Pastures
24 Heterogeneous agricutural areas

231 Pastures
241 Annual crops associated with permanent crops
242 Complex cultivation patterns
243 Land principally occupied by agriculture, with
significant areas of natural vegetation
244 Agro-forestry areas

3 Forest and semi-natural areas
4 Wetlands
5 Water bodies
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Appendix C - Robustness checks
We check the robustness of the result considering alternative specifications of the main empirical
equation used to detect the threshold effect as well as alternative measures of urbanisation.
Table C1 summarises the result of an econometric model in which all the variables are affected by
structural heterogeneity. The equivalent to the standard specification used to detect the threshold,
but now all the covariates are grouped into the X matrix, and the threshold parameter is replaced
with the value estimated previously:
(C1)

UA=θ'1X'1 · I(TV ≥ γ) + θ'2X'2 I(TV < γ) + φM + ∈

This model also includes country dummy variables M and thus the estimates are comparable with
the threshold model with country fixed effects in the third column of table 3.
Table C1: Alternative specifications of the regression model for urbanised area, EU cities, 2012

Intercept
POP
INC
FRAG
TC
ALV
POLY
lnDIST

Main terms

Interaction terms

865.3089*

-918.1249**

(458.5387)

(447.7296)

0.2002***

0.2111***

(0.0123)

(0.0272)

0.3534

-0.4498*

(0.2953)

(.2615)

1004.153***

-973.2117***

(278.6097)

(277.6878)

-726.4336

1069.855*

(590.6851)

(568.7267)

-0.0239

0.0465

(0.1492)

(0.1534)

-715.0769*

916.1349**

(418.3775)

(404.503)

-25.8334*

24.9975*

(13.3176)

(13.2826)

F (4; 349)

1.82

p-value

[0.1237]

Country dummy

YES

Notes to table: Robust SE in parenthesis. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels.

The first and second columns of coefficients in table C1 report the values of coefficients in the θ
and λ vectors of the equation A1, respectively. The coefficients of the interaction terms express the
difference in the impact of the related variable on urbanisation between the two groups. Consistently
with the evidence in table 3, the marginal land consumption per new household is equal to 0.20
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for small FUAs and 0.41 for large FUAs. Similarly, the income coefficients are estimated at 0.35
for large FUAs and at -0.10 for small ones, and the coefficients for administrative fragmentation at
1004 and 31 respectively. In summary, the inclusion of interaction terms for the variables that were
previously excluded does not change the main results. Thus, we look at the additional coefficients
estimated and note that only for the POLY variable there is a statistically significant difference in
the coefficients between the two groups. Note that the coefficient for the interaction term of the
TC variable is significant but only at a 5% level and the coefficient on the main term is altogether
insignificant.
In the lower part of the table, we report the results of an ANOVA test on the hypothesis that the
terms referred to the variable TC, ALV, POLY, and lnDIST. The test is used to compare this model in
table C1 with the model with country fixed effects in table 3. The value of the F-statistic does not
allow rejecting the null hypothesis, and we conclude that the difference between the two models is
not statistically significant and that allowing structural heterogeneity between size groups in all the
variables of the model does not result in substantial changes.
Next, we perform robustness checks on the choice of the dependent variable. The use of the total
built-up area in the city, the dependent variable in our models, is a standard choice in the literature
and follows the reduced form specification (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983) originally presented.
However, the review of the literature on the impacts of administrative fragmentation on urban
development in section 2 highlighted multiple effects that may best be captured by other indicators
of urban development. The three indicators we consider here, namely the inverse of the average size
of urban patches, the percentage of discontinuous urban development, and the share of developed
land.
For each indicator, we run simple regression and threshold regression, and in no case, a threshold
is detected. The procedure ends up indicating the value of a potential threshold, but the estimated
confidence interval is too large, covering almost entirely the sample of observations. Hence, we
present in table C2 the linear model estimates.
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Table C2: The effect of administrative fragmentation on different indicators of urban sprawl, EU cities, 2012
Dependent variable

IAPS

DISC

DEV

Intercept

71.9877***
(18.6052)

61.4994***
(10.7799)

26.7044**
(11.8101)

POP

-0.0015*
(0.0009)

-0.0005
(0.0004)

-0.0017**
(0.0008)

INC

-0.0042
(0.0097)

0.0014
(0.0077)

-0.0034
(0.0081)

FRAG

7.1160**
(3.5557)

6.8127***
(1.6812)

19.2942***
(2.6917)

TC

22.0108
(30.0834)

-3.1683
(8.5775)

0.2072
(19.8046)

ALV

0.0106
(0.0181)

-0.0004
(0.0030)

-0.0126
(0.0106)

POLY

22.3968

0.1202

15.7066*

(14.9314)

(4.2736)

(9.5366)

0.7050

-0.8782***

-0.7505

(0.6526)

(0.3305)

(0.5153)

0.36

0.46

0.29

lnDIST
R2

Notes to table: Robust SE in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels.

In all the regressions the population coefficient is negatively sloped, insignificant when DISC is
the dependent variable, significant but only at a 10% level when IAPS is the dependent variable,
and significant when DEV is the dependent variable. This evidence suggests that the population
is negatively (and weakly) related to urban sprawl or, put differently, sprawl occurs more likely in
less populated metropolitan areas. There are several justifications for this evidence, but the most
prominent is that in large metropolitan areas developable land is a scarce resource and it is used
more efficiently. There is no evidence relating urban sprawl to income, but this lack of evidence is
likely the result of the inclusion of country dummy variables, consistently with the evidence already
discussed in table 3.
The most interesting result concerns the administrative governance, whose coefficient is always
positive and statistically significant. This evidence confirms that more fragmented governance
impacts not only the amount of total built-up area in FUAs but also its geographical distribution
within the FUA, as measured by different sprawl indicators. All the other estimated coefficients are
not significant except the distance decay coefficient when DISC is the dependent variable.
The insignificance of the coefficient of many variables points to misspecification problems in the
results of the models summarised in table C2. Not surprisingly, the goodness of fit of these models
is remarkably low compared to the previous ones. We are aware of this problem with omitted
variables, but we are also confident that the inclusion of country-level fixed effects can effectively
mitigate the bias. Also, we have included population and income information that, according to
existing evidence on the determinants of urban sprawl, are the main explanatory variables which
omission may cause severe estimation bias. Having included the most relevant information and
having controlled for missing information with higher level effects the result about the positive
relationship between administrative fragmentation and urban sprawls is deemed reliable.
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